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PRIVATE SETTLEMENT AS
ALTERNATIVE ADJUDICATION: A
RATIONALE FOR NEGOTIATION
ETHICS

The lawyer's role in facilitating private settlement of civil lawsuits has attracted considerable attention in recent years. A
number of popular and academic texts deal extensively with topics in negotiation and alternative dispute resolution, 1 as do notes
and articles in the legal literature. 2 Relatively little scholarly
treatment, however, has been given to the ethical dilemmas
which inhere in the process of negotiating private settlements. 3
See, e.g., BARGAINING: FORMAL THEORIES OF NEGOTIATION (0. Young ed. 1975); G.
& B. MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS: NEGOTIATION (1981); H. COHEN, You
CAN NEGOTIATE ANYTHING: How To GET WHAT You WANT (1980); H. EDWARDS & J.
WHITE, PROBLEMS, READINGS AND MATERIALS ON THE LAWYER AS A NEGOTIATOR (1977); R.
FISHER & w. URY, GETTING TO YES (1981); J. ILICH, THE ART AND SKILL OF SUCCESSFUL
NEGOTIATION (1973); C. KARRAS$, GIVE & TAKE: THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO NEGOTIATING
1.

BELLOW

STRATEGIES AND TACTICS

(1974);

G. NIERENBERG, FUNDAMENTALS OF NEGOTIATING

H. RAIFFA, THE ART AND ScIENCE OF NEGOTIATION

(1982);

(1973);

H.L. Ross, SETTLED OuT oF

(1970); M. SCHATZKI, NE(1981); A. STRAUSS, NEGOTIATIONS: VARIETIES, CONTEXTS, PROCESSES, AND SOCIAL ORDER (1978); S. THURMAN, E.
PHILLIPS & E. CHEATHAM, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1970); G.
WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT (1983); I. ZARTMAN, THE NEGOTIATION
PROCESS: THEORIES AND APPLICATIONS (1978).
2. See, e.g., Branton, Settlement Strategy, Evaluation, and Brochures, 12 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 407 (1980); Coleman, Teaching the Theory and Practice of Bargaining to Lawyers
and Students, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 470 (1980); Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REV. 637 (1976); Forde, Settlement of the Class Action, 5 LITIGATION, Fall 1978, at 23; Gulliver, Negotiations as a
Mode of Dispute Settlement: Towards a General Model, 7 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 667 (1973);
Peck & Fletcher, A Course on the Subject of Negotiation, 21 J. LEGAL EDUC. 196 (1968);
Voorhees, Law Office Training: The Art of Negotiation, 13 PRAC. LAW., Apr. 1967, at 61;
COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENT
GOTIATION: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF GETTING WHAT You WANT

White, The Lawyer as a Negotiator: An Adventure in Understanding and Teaching the
Art of Negotiation, 19 J. LEGAL EDUC. 337 (1967); Note, An Analysis of Settlement, 22
STAN. L. REV.

67 (1969).

But see G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, supra note 1, at 253-73; H. EDWARDS & J.
WHITE, supra note 1, at 372-419; G. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 90-94, 102-04; Guernsey,
Truthfulness in Negotiation, 17 U. RICH. L. REV. 99 (1982); Hazard, The Lawyer's Obligation To Be Trustworthy When Dealing With Opposing Parties, 33 S.C.L. REV. 181
(1981); King & Sears, The Ethical Aspects of Compromise, Settlement and Arbitration,
25 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 454 (1953); Rubin, A Causerie on Lawyers' Ethics in Negotiation, 35 LA. L. REV. 577 (1975); White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on
3.
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This Note presents a rationale for imposing duties of truthfulness on a lawyer negotiating a private settlement that are, by
analogy, coextensive with an advocate's duty of candor toward
the tribunal. It argues that settlement negotiation is in several
respects surrogate litigation, mirroring in purpose, if not process,
the trial it replaces. Because this shared purpose is the fair and ,
efficient resolution of disputes, a proper goal of negotiation is to
produce a pattern of outcomes that reflects the would-be results
of the controversies were they formally litigated. One way of ensuring analogous outcomes in the civil dispute context is to safeguard the reliability of information in each process with roughly
equivalent protections.
A rule of ethics like the one proposed in this Note takes a step
toward this goal. Part I explores the general nature of unethical
settlement negotiation, and the inadequate responses offered by
both the American Bar Association Model Code of Professional
Responsibility4 and the American Bar Association Model Rules
of Professional Conduct.~ Part II presents a theory for recognizing private settlement negotiation as a substantive component of
the adjudicatory process, deserving of all the ethical protections
afforded forensic litigation. Part III evaluates certain proposals
for reform and responds to various criticisms commonly leveled
against efforts to regulate private negotiation with ethical standards and rules. Finally, Part IV concludes with a Model Rule to
guide lawyers in their private settlement negotiation conduct. 6

I.

THE NEGOTIATION PROBLEM: ETHICAL DEFICIENCIES AND
INADEQUATE RULES

Few would deny the prominence of negotiation in the lawyering enterprise or the vital role played by private settlement in
Lying in Negotiation, 1980 AM. BAR FOUND. RESEARCH J. 926; Comment, The Proposed
Model Rules of Professional Responsibility: Disclosure of Clients' Fraud in Negotiation,
16 U.C.D. L. REV. 419 (1983).
4. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1980).
5. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983).
6. Certain commentators maintain that legal negotiation subsumes too many areas of
bargaining to be governed by a single ethical standard. See, e.g., White, supra note 3, at
927. Indeed, what is appropriate in one negotiation arena may be quite inappropriate in
another. For this reason, the following discussion of negotiation ethics is restricted to
those contexts wherein a lawyer acts in his professional role in settling civil lawsuits.
This restriction is not meant to suggest that codification of ethical norms for other types
of negotiation is not viable, or that these other types of negotiation are in any less need
of such guidance.
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dispute resolution. Negotiated settlement is universally recognized as the preeminent and preferred alternative to trial litigation.7 It is somewhat surprising, therefore, to observe that few of
the profession's articulated standards of conduct reach the ethical problems attending private settlement negotiation.
Even opponents of more stringent ethical standards to govern
negotiation concede that current regulation of a lawyer's conduct in negotiation is "modest."8 The Code of Professional Responsibility9 contains but one Disciplinary Rule 10 whose provisions "touch peripherally" 11 the area of negotiation. DR 7102(A) commands that a lawyer shall not:
-Conceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which he is
required by law to reveal. 12
-Knowingly use perjured testimony or false evidence. 13
-Knowingly make a false statement of law or fact. 14
-Participate in the creation or preservation of evidence
when he knows or it is obvious that the evidence is
false. 16
-Counsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer
knows to be illegal or fraudulent. 16
7. See, e.g., S. THURMAN, E. PHILLIPS & E. CHEATHAM, supra note 1, at 250 ("The
settlement of disputes in court is not only costly in terms of money, time, and emotions
but the administration of justice would soon collapse from overload if the great majority
of disputes were not settled prior to court action."); G. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 90
("Courts consistently affirm that there is an 'overriding public interest in settling and
quieting litigation', and, 'that it has always been the policy of the law to favor compromise and settlement.'") (footnotes omitted); King & Sears, supra note 3, at 454 ("Almost· any attorney . . . will agree that litigation is the undesirable alternative to
compromise.").
8. See, e.g., Hazard, supra note 3, at 188.
9. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility is in force in every state except
Arizona, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana and New Jersey, where versions of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct have recently been adopted.
·
10. Disciplinary Rules [hereinafter cited as DR], in contrast to the Code's "Ethical
Considerations,'' impose binding obligations on the practicing attorney. MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Preamble and Preliminary Statement (1980).
11. Rubin, supra note 3, at 580.
12. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(3) (1980) (emphasis
added). This provision does little more than remind lawyers to obey the law. It in no way
clarifies what the law of disclosure actually is.
13. Id. DR 7-102(A)(4) (emphasis added). The use of the terms "perjured testimony"
and "evidence" indicates the intent of the drafters to apply this obligation to a lawyer's
courtroom conduct, and not to his role in pretrial negotiations.
14. Id. DR 7-102(A)(5).
15. Id. DR 7-102(A)(6) (emphasis added). As with DR 7-102(A)(4), the use of the
term "evidence" restricts the duty described to the forensic setting.
16. Id. DR 7-102(A)(7). This has been interpreted to mean that a lawyer must not
himself engage in fraudulent activity. See Rubin, supra note 3, at 580 n.14.
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-Knowingly engage in other illegal conduct or conduct
contrary to a Disciplinary Rule. 17
Nowhere in the Code of Professional Responsibility does it appear that a lawyer owes any general duty of fairness or candor to
another lawyer or layperson when performing as a negotiator.
Furthermore, no such duty may be derived by inference from
the foregoing provisions. 18
An examination of the Code of Professional Responsibility's
Ethical Considerations (EC) 19 yields no further illumination. EC
7-9 states that "when an action in the best interest of his client
seems to him to be unjust [the lawyer] may ask his client for
permission to forego such action." 20 EC 7-10 provides little more
edification, stating only that "[t]he duty of a lawyer to represent
his client with zeal does not militate against his concurrent obligation to treat with consideration all persons involved in the legal process and to avoid the infliction of needless harm." 21 The
one Ethical Consideration that guides a lawyer's conduct toward
opposing counsel urges merely "courtesy" but not candor. 22
At the heart of the controversy over a lawyer's duty of truthfulness generally is the tension between the duty to maintain
client confidences 23 and the obligation not to assist fraudulent or
dishonest conduct. 24 Both the Code of Professional Responsibility, as amended in 1974, and the Model Rules resolve this conflict in favor of protecting privileged communications. 25 Thus,
17. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(8) (1980) (emphasis
added). Like DR 7-102(A)(3), this provision does little to further a lawyer's understanding of what the profession expects from him. It merely states the obvious principle of
obedience implicit in any law, without explaining how and when the law itself applies.
18. Rubin, supra note 3, at 580.
19. "The Ethical Considerations are aspirational in character and represent the
objectives toward which every member of the profession should strive. They constitute a
body of principles upon which the lawyer can rely for guidance in many specific situations." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Preamble and Preliminary Statement (1980).
20. Id. EC 7-9 (emphasis added). This provision does little to promote good faith in
negotiation, "for such a standard means that the client sets the ultimate ethical parameter for the lawyer's conduct." Rubin, supra note 3, at 584.
21. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-10 (1980).
22. Id. EC 7-38 states: "A lawyer should be courteous to opposing counsel . . . . He
should follow local customs of courtesy or practice, unless he gives timely notice to opposing counsel of his intention not to do so . . . . "
23. See id. DR 4-101(B).
24. See id. DR 1-102(A)(4).
25. Id. DR 4-l0l(C) permits a lawyer to discuss a client's confidences or secrets in
only four narrow circumstances: when the client consents, when permitted by a Disciplinary Rule or required by law, when necessary to prevent a crime intended by the client,
and when necessary to establish or collect his fee or to defend himself against an accusa-
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any duty of candor or truthfulness that may exist in the negotiation context clearly yields to the duties of loyalty and zealous
representation owed the client.
The ethical deficiency of the profession's rules governing negotiation conduct can, and has often, produced morally impoverished results. Courts frequently have overturned private settlements because of fraud or misrepresentation by one of the
negotiating attorneys. 26 Additionally, the large number of cases
evincing lawyers engaged in improper negotiation behavior to secure unfair gains for their clients suggests, at minimum, a
higher, undetected incidence of misconduct by negotiating
attorneys. 27
tion of wrongful conduct.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (1983) likewise obligates a lawyer
to maintain client secrets, except when necessary to prevent the client from committing
a criminal act likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm, or except
when necessary to defend himself against allegations relating to his representation of the
client. Rule l.6(b) is explicitly superordinate to those provisions in the Model Rules requiring truthfulness in statements to others. See id. Rule 4.l(b).
26. Cf. McVeigh v. McGurren, 117 F.2d 672 (7th Cir.) (sustaining divorced wife's
damage award against ex-husband's attorney for fraudulently inducing her to execute
settlement release), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 573 (1941); Slotkin v. Brookdale Hosp. Center,
357 F. Supp. 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (setting aside settlement agreement reached by insurance adjusters who made factual misrepresentations as to policy limits); Cole v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 160 So. 2d 785 (La. Ct. App. 1964) (same); see also Dobbs,
Conclusiveness of Personal Injury Settlements: Basic Problems, 41 N.C.L. REV. 665
(1963). See generally Annot., 71 A.L.R.2D 82 (1960); Annot., 21 A.L.R.2D 272 (1952) (discussing the avoidability of personal injury claim releases on grounds of misrepresentation
by the tortfeasor or his representative). Although courts may vacate improperly bargained settlements, a prophylactic rule of negotiation ethics will reduce both the incidence of the problem and the taxing social and judicial costs of its correction.
27. This conclusion is supported by data gathered in the 1983 Study on the Standards of Legal Negotiations. Conducted by Professor Steven D. Pepe of the University of
Michigan Law School, now a federal magistrate for the Eastern District of Michigan, the
survey explored the attitudes of litigation attorneys, judges, and law school teachers of
professional responsibility regarding ethical issues attending pretrial negotiation.
Results from the sample representing national litigators (1,513 attorneys from large
law firms across the country) are striking. With respect to disclosure of client misrepresentation in settlement negotiation, 31 % of the national sample thought a lawyer could
enter into settlement without disclosing false deposition testimony. Thirty-eight percent
of the national sample thought it permissible for a negotiator to refer to deposition testimony known to be false. Further, if asked during negotiation about the part of the deposition testimony now known to be false, only 49% of the national sample felt that a
response to the question would have to be truthful and complete. Forty-six percent of
the national litigators felt they could give a partially true but incomplete answer that did
not reveal the essential point of falsity in the deposition. By contrast, only five percent of
the national sample felt that a lawyer could positively assert a known falsehood in response to an inquiry.
The survey also questioned lawyers on their perceptions of the frequency of inadequate representations and disclosures in settlement negotiation. Eighteen percent of the
national sample felt that attorneys regularly made representations about facts they reasonably believed, but did not know to be false. And 12% of this group opined that law-
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The following hypothetical situations provide further evidence
of the inability of the present Code of Professional Responsibility to deter unethical negotiation and the inequities which result
therefrom.
A.

Hypothetical One28

Lawyer represents Client injured in an automobile accident.
The client's problems include a severe back injury. Lawyer, however, is unaware that Client sustained the back injury in a previous accident. Opposing counsel is likewise unaware of the earlier
accident, and fails to learn of it during discovery. Lawyer files a
complaint alleging that the present accident is the proximate
cause of Client's back injury, and, still unaware of the injury's
true origin, he begins negotiation. Before a settlement is
reached, Lawyer learns of the earlier accident.
The author of this hypothetical concludes that although Lawyer must urge Client to rectify the fraud, 29 disclosure of the
prior accident without Client's consent would be unethical, because the information was acquired in the course of the representation and is thus a privileged communication. 30 The author
also concludes, however, that because continued representation
of Client would violate the duty not to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, 31 Lawyer is
obliged to withdraw from the representation. 32
yers regularly make representations during negotiation that they in fact know to be
untrue.
Fifty-one percent of the national sample thought unfair and inadequate disclosure of
material information during pretrial negotiation a regular or frequent problem. Roughly
half of the sample believed that the lawyers involved in these cases actually knew of the
incompleteness when giving the information. Only 13% of the surveyed litigators felt
that inaccurate information was a regular or frequent problem. Further, only 17% of the
respondents believed that it was a regular or frequent occurrence for the attorney involved in the negotiation to actually know of the inaccuracy.
These figures are taken from the Interim Report and Preliminary Findings of the
Study on the Standards of Legal Negotiations (1983), prepared by Professor Steven D.
Pepe and submitted to the A.8.A. Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards
and the A.8.A. House of Delegates at their February 1983 meeting. The final findings of
the Study are as yet unpublished, but are on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform.
28. This problem is borrowed from Comment, supra note 3, at 430.
29. Id.; see MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(8)(1) (1980).
30. Comment, supra note 3, at 430; see MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
DR 4-101(8)(1) (1980).
31. Comment, supra note 3, at 430; see MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
DR l-102(A)(4) (1980).
32. Comment, supra note 3, at 430.

WINTER

Negotiation Ethics

1985)

509

The result is troubling. Assuming he is unable to win the client's consent to a full disclosure, the lawyer is faced with the
difficult choice of either becoming involved in a fraudulent settlement or withdrawing from the case altogether. Even if he does
what the Code of Professional Responsibility requires, obedience
to the ethical rules affords little solace to the defendant whose
settlement costs are increased or to the lawyer who must sacrifice business through no fault of his own. Moreover, both the
defendant and the system in general go unprotected. The client
is free to secure substitute counsel, and will know better than to
confide the truth in his new lawyer. Thus, while withdrawal may
calm the conscience of the lawyer by preventing his direct complicity in wrongdoing, it does nothing to guard the integrity of
the ultimate transaction. 33

B.

Hypothetical Two 34

Beach is a small-time attorney representing the Valdezes, a
poor immigrant couple whose son was killed in an automobile
accident. Kepler is a sophisticated litigator with a downtown law
firm, and represents the insurance company of the allegedly negligent car garage. The Valdezes have accused one of the garage's
mechanics of failing to check their vehicle's brakes as requested.
Two critical details set up the ethical problems pertaining to a
lawyer's duty of truthfulness in a settlement negotiation. The
first is that Beach is unaware of the fact that his jurisdiction has
recently shifted from contributory negligence to comparative
negligence in its tort law, and is thus under the misconception
that his clients' failure to protect their son with a seat belt could
be a complete bar to recovery. The second is that the defense's
key witness, a mechanic named Rossini, has, unknown to Beach,
recanted his previous testimony. At an earlier deposition, Rossini swore that at no time did the Valdezes ever ask him to
check the car's brakes. Now he remembers that the Valdezes did
in fact make such a request, and he so informs Kepler.
33. Although a lawyer's withdrawal of representation during negotiation may alert
opposing counsel to a client's misconduct without breaching duties of confidentiality, the
Code of Professional Responsibility does little to protect settlement when it leaves the
ethical sanctity of an agreement to ambiguous signals that may not be recognized by the
opposing counsel.
34. This celebrated problem is borrowed from G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, supra note
1, at 253.
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In the ensuing settlement negotiation, Kepler neglects to correct Beach's mistaken belief that the Valdezes' failure to use
seat belts could completely bar their recovery. Kepler further
maintains that Rossini's testimony is "clearly on his side," a fact
which he knows to be untrue. 311 This posturing-a failure to correct an obvious mistake of law and an affirmative misrepresentation of a critical fact-leads the unwitting Beach to conclude
that he should take what he can get. The lawyers agree on a
settlement of $3,000, which after costs and legal fees might not
even cover the Valdezes' medical expenses.
Even the most hardened insurance company lawyer would
flinch. Yet although the settlement is indisputably unfair, the
authors correctly inform us that Kepler's negotiation tactics are
permissible under existing provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. 36
What is striking about these examples is the fact that in few
instances could any of the described inequities have occurred at
trial. In Hypothetical 1, for example, DR 7-102(A) would prohibit the lawyer from knowingly using false evidence,37 from
knowingly making a false statement of fact, 38 and from participating in the preservation of evidence when he knows that the
evidence is false. 39 Thus, the true origin of the client's back injury could not be concealed from a court. In Hypothetical 2, DR
7-102(A)(4) 40 would prohibit Kepler from knowingly using perjured testimony by Rossini. Likewise, Kepler would have an ethical obligation to inform the tribunal of the jurisdiction's shift
from contributory negligence to comparative negligence. 41
These unjust results raise the question whether any justification exists for having a lower requirement of truthfulness in the
negotiation setting than that imposed in the forensic setting.4 2
35. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should prevent this by requiring the lawyer
to supplement the deposition and correct inaccuracies of which he has become aware.
See FED. R. C1v. P. 26(e); see also C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: C1v1L § 2048, at 319-21 (1970) (indicating that deposition testimony constitutes a
"response" within the meaning of Rule 26(e)).
36. G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, supra note 1, at 262-63.
37. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(4) (1980).
38. Id. DR 7-102(A)(5).
39. Id. DR 7-102(A)(6).
40. Id. DR 7-102(A)(4).
41. See id. EC 7-23 ("Where a lawyer knows of legal authority in the controlling
jurisdiction directly adverse to the position of his client, he should inform the tribunal of
its existence unless his adversary has done so . . . . "); see also A.B.A. Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 146 (1935); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(3) (1983).
42. This thinking is suggested in Hazard, supra note 3, at 18~ ("[l]n light of a law-

WINTER

•

Negotiation Ethics

1985)

511

Because unequal duties of truthfulness will lead to differentially
reliable information being considered in each forum, the outcomes of private settlement negotiation do not always correspond with the results that would have been reached by trial.
Often, as in the above hypotheticals, the variance in outcomes is
quite extreme. To redress this weakness in our adjudicatory system, a lawyer's duties of truthfulness in private settlement negotiations should be functionally coextensive with his duties of
candor toward the tribunal.

II. A

RATIONALE FoR DUTIES OF TRUTHFULNESS

A relatively firm standard of truthfulness guides a lawyer's
conduct in the forensic setting,43 although the adequacy of existing standards is fiercely contested." As has already been
noted, however, no such standard regulates the behavior of attorneys in the negotiation context. 411
A.

The Prominence of Negotiated Settlement

The absence of ethical standards is particularly disturbing
when one considers the extraordinary extent to which private
negotiation, and the settlements derived therefrom, dominate
our justice system. One published study showed that of 193,000
personal injury claims in New York City, only 7,000 reached
trial, of which only 2,500 produced a jury verdict."6 A study in
Chicago disclosed that eighty-five percent of all personal injury
yer's duty of candor inside a courtroom, a question arises whether lawyers should also be
required to be fully candid when speaking for a client outside of court. Such a requirement would seem to be a true measure of trustworthiness."). Critics of this view, however, justify their opposition by distinguishing two features of the negotiation process:
noninvolvement of the judicial branch and assumption of risk, or waiver of known rights,
by private actors. These arguments are rebutted infra notes 73-77 and accompanying
text.
43. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A) (1980); MODEL
Ruu:s OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 (1983).
44. For contrasting viewpoints, compare Frankel, The Search for Truth: An
Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1975) with Freedman, Judge Frankel's Search
for Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1060 (1975).
45. "[M]ost courts would hold that a special duty is owed to them-a duty which
would make what is permissible in private transactions, impermissible in court transactions." Guernsey, supra note 3, at 121.
46. Rosenberg & Sovern, Delay and the Dynamics of Personal Injury Litigation, 59
COLUM. L. REV. 1115, 1124 (1959).
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claims handled by insurers are settled prior to the filing of a
suit, and that only ten percent of the suits filed are actually
brought to trial. 47 More recent estimates indicate that close to
ninety percent of all civil claims filed are settled without trial. 48
Indeed, no one disputes the relief that privately negotiated settlements afford our overburdened judicial system. •9
B.

Exhortations from the Judiciary

The foregoing statistics are punctuated by the fact that, to an
ever-increasing extent, lawyers are being encouraged to pursue
alternative methods of dispute resolution. Federal judges, including Chief Justice Burger, frequently exhort members of the
practicing bar to forego courtroom contest whenever feasible. 110
But under the present rules of professional responsibility, a
heightened reliance on extra-judicial conflict resolution permits
a greater number of disputes to be administered under a lower
standard of ethics. 111 In litigation, both citizens and the system
itself are protected by ethical obligations and rules of court that
restrain lawyers. Unless corresponding restraints are placed on
lawyers when negotiating out of court, such protection is lost. 112
47. Comment, Settlement of Personal Injury Cases in the Chicago Area, 47 Nw. U.L.
REV. 895, 895 n.5 (1953).
48. See, e.g., Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and
Don't Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious
Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4, 27-28 (1983); Sarat, The role of courts and the logic of court
reform: notes on the Justice Department's approach to improving justice, 64 JUDICATURE 300, 303 (1981).
49. "The simple fact is that more law is made and administered and more disputes
are adjudicated in the private legal process than in the legislature, the administrative
agency, and the courts combined." L. PATTERSON & E. CHEATHAM, THE PROFESSION OF
LAW 130 (1971).
50. Burger, The State of Justice, 70 A.B.A. J. 62, 66 (1984); Burger, Isn't There a
Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 294 (1982); see also Title, The Lawyer's Role in Settlement
Conferences, 67 A.B.A. J. 592 (1981).
51. See supra notes 8-41 and accompanying text; see also Shaffer, Negotiation Ethics: A Report to Cartaphila, 7 LmGATION, Winter 1981, at 37, 39:
[The] modern bias against trials poses a moral problem for the country's lawyernegotiators. Lawyers no longer are responsible for the justice of their own arguments and their clients' claims. They must get the best results for their clients.
The judiciary, operating with an adversary system, is the source of justice. However, a dispute that will never see the inside of a courtroom is never exposed to
the system that determines what is just.
52. One could reasonably argue, however, that the imposition of ethical constraints
on lawyers in the negotiation setting might diminish the attractiveness of private settlement as an alternative to trial. This, in turn, would lead to more litigation and increased
docket crowding. Two responses to this argument suggest themselves. First, those who
would be deterred from pursuing private settlement because of the ethical limitations
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Negotiated settlement then ceases to be alternative justice, and
instead becomes justice circumvented. 63

C.

A Substantive Part of the Adjudicatory Process

Given the statistics and the apparent predilections of the judiciary, it is surprising that few commentators are willing to recognize private settlement as a substantive part of our adjudicatory
system. Despite the fact that private settlement literally takes
the place of litigation in an overwhelming number of cases, negotiation is typically viewed as something distinct and fundamentally different from a trial on the merits. 64 Although scholars disagree on the extent to which negotiation is more or less
adversarial than litigation, 66 emphasis is routinely placed on the
differences rather than similarities between the two. 66 Undoubtplaced on negotiation behavior would be no more inclined to litigate. Trial would offer
no relaxation of these ethical duties, and instead would promise greater delays, costs,
and uncertainties. Moreover, if the proposed rule chills less ethical laWYers from representing certain clients altogether, or deters these clients from seeking legal representation in the first place, the profession is none the worse for their nonparticipation. Second, it is no less reasonable to believe that a rule of negotiation ethics might make
private settlement a more attractive alternative. Ethical protections could enhance the
reliability of negotiated settlement, and so provide additional incentives for its utilization. See infra notes 82-86 and accompanying text. For just as less ethical attorneys
might reject negotiation on account of what they might lose, more ethical attorneys
might embrace it for what they might gain.
53. An increasing number of courts are resolving this dilemma-that is, the growing
reliance upon alternative dispute resolution mechanisms that use lower ethical standards-through use of a mock trial procedure known as Summary Jury Trial. See ASPEN
INSTITUTE, CPR LEGAL PROGRAM PROCEEDINGS (1984). Developed by Judge Thomas Lambros of the Northern District of Ohio, Summary Jury Trial engages laWYers in a nontestimonial adversary proceeding before a live jury. Each side presents its case in abbreviated
form, summarizing depositions rather than calling witnesses. Following this, the jury renders a verdict. Although the judgment is not binding, it is typically viewed by the disputants as an accurate prediction of what a court would do in actual litigation, and thus
serves to facilitate settlement. See id. at 19-21 (Remarks of Judge Richard A. Enslen
(W.D. Mich.)). Significantly, the only rule that governs this otherwise informal process is
a strict duty of truthfulness imposed on the participating attorneys.
54. M. BELLI, MODERN TRIALS § 109 (1954), discusses negotiated settlement as the
attractive alternative to trial. See also Hazard, supra note 3, at 187 (describing duties of
forensic disclosure as "peripheral to the exploration of truthfulness between opposing
parties in negotiation").
55. White, supra note 3, at 927, analogizes negotiation to a poker game, each participant attempting to mislead without being misled in an effort to gain advantage over his
adversary. By contrast, L. PATTERSON & E. CHEATHAM, supra note 49, at 118-83, argue
that private negotiation is inherently more cooperative than litigation, and that laWYers
should thus adhere to a higher standard of truthfulness in this context.
56. Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 638 states:
Nowhere does the contrast between official processes and their private counterparts appear greater than between adjudication and negotiation. Adjudication is
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edly, the bright line drawn between private settlement and
courtroom adjudication explains the imbalance in the level of
truthfulness ~equired in each.
Other commentators, however, have pointed out certain operative and theoretical resemblances between negotiated settlement and trial on the merits, implying, perhaps, that the two are
complementary components of a larger system of adjudication. 07
One pair of authors has explicitly characterized negotiated dispute settlement as part of a "private legal process. " 08 That the
vast majority of litigable cases are resolved out of court, however, does not alone compel the conclusion that private settlement serves a judicial function. But a look at the substantive
aspects of settlement negotiation reveals a process whose purposes and norms correspond closely to its courtroom
counterpart.
Negotiation of private settlements, like formal litigation, takes
root in a set of circumstances giving rise to the assertion of
rights by one party against another. Lawyers come to the bargaining table, however, in an effort to avoid the cost and stress
of trial.6 9 When negotiation fails, litigation results. With trial
thus the omnipresent backdrop to the bargaining process, lawyers not surprisingly negotiate in a way that contemplates litigation. 60 In negotiation, each attorney bargains with a persuasive
conventionally perceived as a norm-bound process centered on the establishment
of facts and the determination and application of principles, rules, and precedents. Negotiation, on the other hand, is conventionally perceived as a relatively
norm-free process centered on the transmutation of underlying bargaining
strength into agreement . . . .
See also Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
57. See, e.g., Patterson & Cheatham, The Lawyer and the Private Legal Process, 24
VAND. L. REV. 295, 296 (1971):
The emphasis on the public responsibility of the lawyer has been focused on the
advocate rather than the office lawyer. Yet, the public responsibilities of one are
no less than those of the other, for their roles are complementary. The office
lawyer shares with the advocate a fundamental problem: how can he best perform his dual role as a private representative of his client and a public representative of the social order?
58. Id. at 308-10.
59. Hazard, supra note 3, at 187.
60. Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 664-65 observes:
Because of their training, and the fact that typically they become involved only
when formal litigation is contemplated, lawyers are likely to negotiate on the
basis of legal principles, rules, and precedents. When these two elements are
combined, the result is that paired legal affiliates typically function as a coupled
unit which is strikingly similar to a formal adjudicative unit in terms of both
input and output.
But see id. at 665 n.81 (discussing the differences in procedure and style between lawyeradjudicators and formal adjudicative units).
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prediction of what a court would do were the case litigated, and
from the confrontation of arguments emerges what the parties
believe is a fair agreement. 61 The lawyers offer versions of the
facts in much the same way witnesses would at trial. They interpret these facts and proffer legal arguments for assigning or
avoiding liability in a way suggesting trial advocacy. 62 They eval61. See Galanter, Worlds of Deals: Using Negotiation to Teach About Legal Process,
34 J. LEGAL Eouc. 268, 268-69 (1984):
The courts are central to the litigotiation [combined litigation and negotiation]
game because of the 'bargaining endowments' they bestow on the parties. What
might be done by (or in or near) a court, that is, gives the parties bargaining
chips or counters. Bargaining chips derive from the substantive entitlements
conferred by legal rules and from the procedural rules that enable these entitlements to be vindicated.
See also Note, supra note 2, at 68 ("Settlement negotiations proceed within the bounds
of the parties' expectations about the outcome of ... litigation. Therefore, settlement
negotiations entail acting upon predictions of future events, which involve estimates
both of probabilities and of dollar values."). Concededly, these textual statements present an oversimplified model of negotiation by presuming that projected legal rights are
the principal determinants of negotiated agreements. Although this is not untrue, other
considerations incident to bargaining power, such as relative financial strength and eagerness to avoid trial, are often vitally important to both the process and ultimate content of private settlements. See Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1076 (1984).
Because these collateral considerations cannot be categorized in any way, analytical emphasis is placed on the impact of applicable legal rules.
62. Cf. Jackson & Eisenhardt, Negotiations in Commercial Cases: Assess-Advise-Advocate, 5 LITIGATION, Fall 1978, at 32 (describing the negotiation process as anticipatory
trial advocacy); Wallach, Settlement in a Personal Injury Case: The Imperfect Art, 5
LITIGATION, Fall 1978, at 35 (same). But see L. PATI'ERSON & E. CHEATHAM, supra note
49, at 121:
Conciliation and negotiation both call for advocacy, but advocacy different from
that in a trial. The advocate in negotiation presents his facts and arguments to
the other party for agreement, rather than to a tribunal for a decision. The difference is best perceived in terms of the assumptions that underlie advocacy in
the judicial process of litigation and those which underlie the private process of
negotiation. Litigation assumes an irreconcilable conflict between the parties,
that one party is wholly at fault, that one party must win, and that the end of
the dispute is more important than the right decision. Negotiation assumes that
the parties desire to reach an agreement, that each is fair-minded and willing to
be convinced, that each will yield to a more reasonable view advanced by the
other, and that the right decision requires a coordination of interests for their
mutual benefit.
It should be noted, however, that Professors Patterson and Cheatham distinguish negotiation advocacy from trial advocacy in an effort to show that negotiation is more accomodative and less adversarial in character, and that lawyers in the negotiation setting
should thus be held to a higher standard of ethics:
The negotiator in the office and the advocate in the courtroom . . . have two
entirely different functions to perform which call for different standards. The
negotiator is dealing with the other party not as a plaintiff or a defendant, but as
an individual person whose cooperation is desirable, and perhaps essential, to
the best interest of his client. Thus, there is only one basic standard for the
lawyer that is particularly applicable to his role as negotiator and that is
honesty.
Id. at 123 (emphasis added).
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uate the merit of these legal arguments like judges.63 And ultimately, based upon a concerted interpretation of the facts as
governed by the applicable law, they decide who should pay
whom and how much. 64 Given this structure of the bargaining
process, lawyers achieve in settlement something far more significant than a resolution of conflict. They determine the substantive legal rights of the parties, replacing jury verdict with an alternative adjudication. 6 & Thus, although the style and
procedural format of litigation distinguish it from the relatively
informal nature of private settlement negotiation,66 the objectives and corresponding methodologies of the two processes are
quite similar. 67
As an essentially judicial process-one in which, despite the
nonjudicial setting, important legal rights are determined and
vindicated-private settlement negotiations deserve all the ethical protections that apply to the forensic setting. This argument
is strengthened to the extent that our legal system already recognizes private settlement as a substantive component of the adjudicatory process. 68 Consider, for example, the current Federal
63. See Fisher, Comment, 34 J. LEGAL Eouc. 120, 122 (1984):
Two judges, in trying to reach agreement, will he looking for standards that
should decide the case. They may have their predispositions, and even stronglyheld views, but they will jointly look for an agreed basis for decision. Each will
typically advance law, precedent, and evidence not simply as rationalizations for
positions adopted for other reasons, but honestly, as providing a fair basis for
decision. . . . Two negotiators can be compared with two judges trying to decide
a case. There won't be a decision unless they agree. It is perfectly possible for
fellow negotiators, despite their self-interest, to behave like fellow judges, in that
they advance reasoned argument seriously, and are open to persuasion by better
arguments.
64. M. BELLI, supra note 54, at § 106, endorses the idea of "selling your case" to
opposing counsel as one would to a court as an effective negotiation strategy. The socalled "Brochure Method" involves marshalling all of the evidence and legal theories one
would present at trial and constructing a case that the adversary would rather purchase
than risk letting go to a jury.
65. Cf. Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 662 ("An adjudicative function of a sort is an
implicit element of the norm-centered model of dispute-negotiation ... since resolution
of a dispute will turn in large part on the judgment each party renders on the norms and
facts adduced by the other.").
66. See id. at 653-60.
67. One writer even fuses the concepts of negotiation and litigation in his analysis of
private dispute settlement:
On the contemporary American legal scene the negotiation of disputes is not an
alternative to litigation. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that it is litigation.
There are not two distinct processes, negotiation and litigation; there is a single
process of disputing in the vicinity of official tribunals that we might call litigotiation, that is, the strategic pursuit of a settlement through mobilizing the court
process.
Galanter, supra note 61, at 268 (emphasis in original).
68. See G. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 101 (discussing the various ways in which
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Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 16 explicitly gives courts the discretion to arrange pretrial conferences in the interest of "facilitating the settlement of the case."69 More than an implicit encouragement to lawyers to settle claims out of court, Rule 16 is
clear in its recognition of private settlement as a worthwhile
form of legal dispute resolution. 70 Rule 68 likewise incorporates
an important aspect of private settlement negotiation into the
adjudicatory process. 71 It encourages the defendant to extend a
timely offer of settlement, and further encourages the plaintiff
to accept a reasonable offer, threatening him with liability for
the costs incurred after the offer's making should such offer turn
out to be more favorable than the ultimate judgment of the
court. The conclusion compelled, therefore, is that if the law already recognizes private settlement as a substantive component
of the adjudicatory process, the profession should regulate the
negotiations producing such settlements in a manner consistent
with its regulation of other areas of the legal system. 72
courts typically involve themselves in settlement negotiations); see also Renfrew, Negotiations and Judicial Scrutiny in Civil and Criminal Antitrust Cases, 57 CHI. B. REC. 130
(1975).
69. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(5); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a)(7).
70. For contrasting views on the effectiveness of the pretrial conference in settling
disputes, compare A. LEVIN & E. WooLEY, DISPATCH AND DELAY 63-66 (1961) with M
ROSENBERG, THE PRETRIAL CONFERENCE AND EFFECTIVE JUSTICE 67-70 (1964). See also
Lynch, Settlement of Civil Cases: A View from the Bench, 5 LmGATION, Fall 1978, at 8
(discussing worthwhile uses of the formal settlement conference).
71. FED. R. CIV. P. 68 provides in relevant part:
At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins, a party defending against
a claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to be taken
against him for the money or property or to the effect specified in his offer, with
costs then accrued. If within 10 days after the service of the offer the adverse
party serves written notice that the offer is accepted, either party may then file
the offer and notice of acceptance together with proof of service thereof and
thereupon the clerk shall enter judgment. An offer not accepted shall be deemed
withdrawn and evidence thereof is not admissible except in a proceeding to determine costs. If the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more
favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the making of the offer . . . .
Although this rule has been used sparingly in the past, greater recognition of its potential impact is evident in more recent scholarly literature. See, e.g., Kempf, Rule 68 Offers
of Judgment: An Underused Tool, 7 LmGATION, Spring 1981, at 39; Note, The Impact of
Proposed Rule 68 on Civil Rights Litigation, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 719 (1984); Note, Rule
68: A "New" Tool for Litigation, 1978 DuKE L.J. 889.
72. The 1970 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure introduced what
are essentially duties of truthfulness to the pretrial discovery context. See FED. R. CIV. P.
26(e)(2), 26(g). Through these amendments, courts have imposed duties once owed exclusively to the tribunal on lawyers in particular out-of-court contexts. Although discovery rules can be distinguished from negotiation rules in that they essentially protect the
trial process, a reasonable interpretation of the amended Federal Rules is that the drafters recognized that an important part of the adjudicatory process takes place outside the
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D. Rebutting the Waiver Argument
Acknowledging private settlement as part of the adjudicatory
process, rather than something distinct from it, defuses what
would otherwise be a compelling argument against imposing duties of truthfulness on negotiating attorneys. The argument concerns the freedom of nonlitigating parties to waive certain legal
rights, and the ethical protections that safeguard these rights,
when negotiating settlement out of court.
In choosing whether to negotiate a settlement or proceed to
trial, parties make a judgment about which tactic will ultimately
yield the most satisfying results. Part of the attraction to settlement, of course, is the relative saving in cost and time, and the
minimization of r\sk in avoiding jury judgment. Another attraction, however, may simply be the desire of clients to see disputes
resolved in a forum where their lawyers exert more control over
the outcome. In the judicial system, the argument goes, cost
saving and expeditiousness are values subordinated to an overriding concern with justice. But in the nonjudicial realm of
which private settlement is a part, 73 these values compete more
equally with the aim of reaching a legally correct result. Parties
to a negotiation often concede advantages and forego opportunities that would be theirs at trial, merely to facilitate settlement
of the case. Although justice does not compel negotiators to
compromise in the ways they invariably do, competing concerns
of time, money, and long-term relations with their adversary
may. In other words, although strictly just decisions are the paramount objective of the trial court, they may not be as important to the parties themselves.
This point might appear to imperil the entire rationale for imposing duties of truthfulness on lawyers in the negotiation context. One could reasonably argue that in electing to negotiate
rather than litigate, parties waive the "correct" resolution of
their legal rights in consideration of certain concerns they regard
as more significant. This accepted, one must then ask why the
law should impose rules of conduct that reflect its primary purposes on nonlitigating parties who may not fully share these
same purposes.
One answer is that negotiation by lawyer is a part of the adjucourtroom, and that this part deserves as much protection as any other.
73. Private settlement is nonjudicial in the sense that no third party determines the
outcome of the dispute in a public forum. It is in most other respects adjudicatory in
nature. See supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text.
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dicatory process, not an alternative to it. When parties involve
lawyers in the settlement of their disputes, they invoke the legal
system and its overriding concern with justice; they do not waive
it. Lawyers are officers of the court and thus owe a duty to promote justice in their professional conduct. 74 In this regard, it is
important to note that a rule of negotiation ethics to regulate
private settlement behavior would be imposed on lawyers, not
clients. 7r. Thus, parties who retain attorneys to negotiate settlement of their civil lawsuits waive only the freedom to engage in
behavior that is inconsistent with the goals and concerns of the
legal system, as reflected in the professional obligations imposed
on lawyers. The decision to forego trial by enlisting lawyers as
their bargaining agents does not place them beyond the purview
of the law.
Furthermore, the so-called waiver argument suffers from internal inconsistency. The argument's basic assumption is that
negotiating parties knowingly sacrifice the "legally correct" resolution of their disputes in consideration of other nonlegal concerns they hold to be more important. But for such sacrifices to
constitute voluntary waiver, they must be meaningfully made
through informed decision. 76 Because the absence of ethical protections in negotiation can obscure what would be the legally
correct resolution of the dispute to either or both of the participants, 77 parties who elect to negotiate cannot be sure of what
they are giving up and thus cannot be said to waive with knowledge. Paradoxically, meaningful waiver can be achieved only if
the parties are reasonably confident of the objectively correct judicial resolution of the case. As has been previously noted, this
requires ethical protections to safeguard the reliability of inform a ti on that will produce such mutually confident
understanding.
74. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (1980) ("The professional responsibility of a lawyer derives from his membership in a profession which has
the duty of assisting members of the public to secure and protect available legal rights
and benefits.").
75. The waiver argument is more convincing in the case of private parties who elect
to resolve their disputes without the assistance of lawyers.
76. Waiver is defined as:
·
The intentional or voluntary relinquishment of a known right,. . . or when one
dispenses with the performance of something he is entitled to exact or when one
in possession of any right, whether conferred by law or by contract, with full
knowledge of the material facts, does or forbears to do something the doing of
which or the failure of forbearance to do which is inconsistent with the right, or
his intention to rely upon it.
BLACK'S LAW D1CTIONARY 1417 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis ~dded).
77. See, e.g., supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
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Faster, Fairer, and More Final Justice

A stated purpose of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is
"to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination"78 of
civil cases. Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-25 likewise
states: "Rules of evidence and procedure are designed to lead to
just decisions and are part of the framework of the law."79 It is
universally accepted that truthfulness at trial promotes faster
and fairer justice. The same, however, can be said for private
settlement negotiation. 8° Caridor in negotiation promotes settlement81 by assuring early disclosure of the facts and thereby developing understanding. Bargaining is inefficient when parties
78. FED. R CIV. P. 1.
79. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-25 (1980).
80. A recent study of the negotiation process ranked ethical conduct as the highestrated characteristic of "effective/cooperative negotiators," citing forthrightness, willingness to share information, trustfulness, objectivity, and fair-mindedness among the best
strategies of negotiators of this type. See G. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 20-22. The study
also notes:
[C]ooperative effectives seek to facilitate agreement, they avoid use of threats,
they accurately estimate the value of cases they are working on . . . and they are
willing to share information with their opponent. It appears from these items
that their strategy is to approach negotiation in an objective, fair, trustworthy
way, and to seek agreement by the open exchange of information. They are apparently as concerned with getting a settlement that is fair to both sides as they
are with maximizing the outcome for their own client.
Id. at 22. It should be noted, however, that these traits are no guarantee of negotiation
success, as the study indicates that they are shared by effective and ineffective cooperatives alike. Id. at 34-36.
The study classified 65% of the negotiators surveyed as "cooperatives" and 24% as
"competitives". Eleven percent of the classified attorneys fell outside these two categories. A highly significant conclusion of the study was that both effective/cooperatives and
effective/competitives share the traits of ethicality, trustworthiness, and honesty:
Given the current interest and concern about professional responsibility in the
Bar, the high ratings on ethical[ity] and trustworth[iness] for both effective
groups are worthy of notice. Although literature on professional responsibility
generally argues that high ethical standards are a precondition to success in
practice, many law students and some practicing attorneys continue to believe or
suspect that they must compromise their ethical standards in order to effectively
represent their clients and attain success in practice. The findings of this survey
suggest such compromises may be not only unnecessary, but actually counterproductive to one's effectiveness in negotiation situations.
Id. at 27.
81. "That candor as to the facts does facilitate negotiations is too plain to be disputed." L. PATTERSON & E. CHEATHAM, supra note 49, at 124; see also G. WILLIAMS. supra
note 1, at 22:
The attitude of effective/cooperatives is reflected in attorney comments. For example, one attorney wrote: "The vital item in negotiation for me is trust in the
other attorney. If an attorney has a good reputation and/or I have dealt with
him before and found him honest, I can and will negotiate pragmatic settlements, hopefully to the long term benefit of both parties."
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cannot trust each other, because the route to agreement is likely
to be circuitous when lawyers must guard against the unscrupulousness of their adversaries. 82 Professor Hazard makes this
point forcefully when he states that trustworthiness among lawyers in negotiation reduces transaction costs. 83 The ability to
rely on the representations of an adversary as "firm, factual
components of [the] transaction" obviates the need for conducting independent factual investigations that are time-consuming and costly. 84 Indeed, the ultimate expression of parties'
mutual lack of confidence is the decision to litigate in court,
where disputants are presumably protected by rules of court and
standards of professional ethics. 86 Needless to say, investigations, discovery proceedings, and of course trials, raise the cost
of dispute resolution considerably. By contrast, the cost of
truthfulness in negotiation is likely to be negligible, if such
truthfulness is reciprocal and reliable. 86
This suggests another dimension to the comparison drawn between litigation and negotiation. A litigated result only resolves
a dispute with finality to the extent parties have confidence in
the judicial decision. If the award seems unjust under the cir82. Cf. Voorhees, supra note 2, at 64 ("Candor and sincerity are the most powerful
weapons of a good advocate. As soon as the adversary understands that he is dealing
with a man of integrity, the discussions can proceed with directness, and the time wasted
in beating around the bush may be eliminated.").
83. Hazard, supra note 3, at 183-85 (citing Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics:
The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & EcoN. 233 (1979)).
84. Id.
85. This is undoubtedly the thinking which underlies the full disclosure approach
advocated in M. BELLI, supra note 54, at § 106:
The trial of the modern lawsuit is a 'race of disclosure' and not a 'series of surprises' . . . . Defendants will have all the facts, good and bad, by the time of
trial anyhow. . . . A hopeful reliance upon defendant's inability to discover
weaknesses in plaintiff's case is a dependency upon a false premise in modern
trial preparation. If, at the time of trial, defendant has not discovered certain
facts, plaintiff will have to disclose them upon a full opening statement, anyhow.
86. Hazard, supra note 3, at 184. This is not, however, a universally accepted proposition. See, e.g., White, supra note 3.
Commentators have also noted that lawyers have an additional self-interest in conducting truthful negotiations. See, e.g., Drinker, Some Remarks on Mr. Curtis' "The
Ethics of Advocacy," 4 STAN. L. REV. 349 (1952):
A lawyer does not acquire valuable clients by getting a reputation for being
willing to practice any kind of chicanery on their behalf. It is too apt to occur to
the good client that the lawyer who, when 'in a corner' or 'on the spot' will lie for
him, may, in a similar corner, lie to him for the lawyer's own advantage.
Id. at 349 (emphasis in original). Moreover, if a lawyer gets the reputation in his professional community for being a hard bargainer, he may be prejudicing the interests of
future clients on whose behalf he may wish to negotiate. Lawyers are less likely to bargain with an attorney they believe is not trustworthy. More dramatically, the lawyer
swindled in last week's negotiation may be in a position to return the swindle this week.
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cumstances, or if the court's interpretation of the law is contested, a litigant may appeal the decision to a higher court. By
analogy, a negotiated agreement stands on similar ground. To
the extent that one or more of the parties perceives that the
facts have not been adequately adduced, or that doubt remains
with respect to a court's likely resolution of a particular question
of law, they may pursue the matter in formal litigation. In other
words, in both litigation and negotiation, the decision of whether
to take a dispute to the next level of the adjudicatory process
will depend largely on the extent to which uncertainty remains
with regard to issues of fact or law. 87 Because truthfulness
reduces uncertainty, and uncertainty perpetuates conflict, it can
be fairly said that truthfulness promotes conflict resolution and
thereby lowers costs. 88

III.

PROPOSALS FOR REFORM AND THEIR CRITICS

The call for higher levels of ethics in private settlement negotiation has early origins. 89 Yet, the perceived need for more
stringent duties of truthfulness in this context continues to draw
considerable commentary. 90 Although many academics agree in
principle, however, with the idea of requiring lawyers to assume
greater obligations of truthfulness when negotiating settlements,
87. See Note, supra note 2, at 88 (stating that "[i]f the parties to a dispute are reasonably certain of what the outcome in court will be, they will be more likely to avoid
litigation costs by settling immediately").
88. Hazard, supra note 3, at 184-85; see also Cooter & Marks, Bargaining In The
Shadow Of The Law: A Testable Model Of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225
(1982).
89. See, e.g., Herrington, Compromise and Contest in Legal Controversies, 16 AB.A.
J. 795, 798 (1930) (stating that "one should go into a conference realizing that he is an
instrument for the furtherance of justice and is under no obligation to aid his client in
obtaining unconscionable advantage"); cf. King & Sears, supra note 3:
If . . . the general public remains suspicious and distrustful of the profession, its
members will never fulfill the obligations to the public and to their country
which they rightfully should assume. Only the lawyers, by their actions and attitudes, individually and in concert, can make themselves worthy of public respect. . . . Our thesis is this: If our profession is to deserve respect, if we are to
be officers of the court in fact, and if we are to obey the mandates of our professional oath and our canons of ethics, we must find an approach in which less
emphasis is placed on success measured in dollars, and much more emphasis is
directed toward our responsibilities as public servants and ministers of justice.
Id. at 462.
For a contemporary commentary suggesting that lawyers should accept greater responsibility for doing justice in negotiation, see Shaffer, supra note 51.
90. See, e.g., Guernsey, supra note 3; Hazard, supra note 3; White, supra note 3;
Rubin, supra note 3.
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few are optimistic about the prospects of achieving any substantive improvement through rules of ethics. 91
A.

Ineffectual Reform

Only two writers have attempted actual reform of the "rules"
governing negotiation ethics through concrete proposals, 92 and
neither effort is satisfying. Professor Guernsey points out that
truthfulness in negotiation is an issue governed largely by unarticulated conventions that vary according to both geography and
"professional strata," and that reliance on these conventions has
produced troubling results. 93 The author's first recommendation
is that the professional bar generate discussion of ethical
problems in negotiation from which acceptable conventions of
tactics and truthfulness could emerge in articulated form. 9 " Alternatively, the author suggests that the profession accept the
fact that no guidance for this area of the law is available and
endorse the notion of "caveat lawyer."911 As justification for this
principle, the author cites the following: (1) ease of administration; (2) elimination of the hypocrisy which attends unenforceable rules that are routinely violated; (3) consistency with the
standards of negotiation conduct currently in place in the profession; and (4) clarification of guidelines that are presently
91. See, e.g., Hazard, supra note 3, at 181 ("It is desirable that lawyers be trustworthy in dealing with opposing parties. It is impractical, however, to go very far in formulating rules of professional conduct that require lawyers to be trustworthy."). See generally White, supra note 3. But see Rubin, supra note 3.
92. The American Bar Association, however, has on numerous occasions considered
proposed rules of professional responsibility that would apply directly to the negotiation
process. In 1980, for example, the A.B.A. proposed the following rule in a discussion
draft of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct ultimately rejected by the A.B.A.
House of Delegates:
Fairness To Other Participants
(a) In conducting negotiations a lawyer shall be fair in dealing with other
participants.
(b) A lawyer shall not make a knowing misrepresentation of fact or law, or fail
to disclose a material fact known to the lawyer, even if adverse, when disclosure
is:
(1) Required by law or the rules of professional conduct; or
(2) Necessary to correct a manifest misapprehension of fact or law resulting from a previous representation made by the lawyer or known by
the lawyer to have been made by the client . . . .
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.2 (Discussion Draft 1980).
93. Guernsey, supra note 3, at 100-02.
94. Id. at 103-25.
95. Id. at 125-26. The rule is stated, "[l]n negotiations, absent a clearly expressed
specific duty to the contrary-such as to a court-caveat lawyer."
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ambiguous. 96
The proposal and its four-part rationale amount to an admission of defeat, an abandonment of the task of reform. Each justification for this rule of nonregulation collapses under the
weight of the rule's presumed purpose-reform. A rule rationalized by the ease of its administration is merely a line of least
resistance. Additionally, a rule that simply codifies existing conventions of practice quite clearly produces no change in the area
it is designed to regulate. Because change is the objective of a
rule of negotiation ethics, this proposal is conceptually flawed in
that it reinforces the very negotiation tactics that inspire reform. 97 Furthermore, legislating standardlessness to resolve uncertainty in existing standards is patently inappropriate to the
whole idea of reform. Not only does such a rule fail to realize its
purpose, it abdicates the purpose altogether. The answer is not
to abandon guidelines, but instead to promulgate good ones in
the form of rules. Finally, the notion that 'no rule' is better than
an unenforceable one is simply not a proposition supported by
evidence or reason. 98
An earlier writer advocating the imposition of higher standards of truthfulness on lawyers in the negotiation context came
much closer to the mark. 99 In his thoughtful essay on negotiation
ethics, Judge Rubin proposes a two-part affirmative ethical standard for lawyers in negotiation: 100
(1)
(2)

The lawyer must act honestly and in good faith; 101
and
The lawyer may not accept a result that is unconscionably unfair to the other party. 102

Judge Rubin concludes that such duties of good faith and truthfulness would reduce inequalities in bargaining power and tend
to produce negotiation results that are basically fair. 103
96. Id.
97. Professor Guernsey himself states, "Lawyers' ethics are so often drawn into question these days that officially to approve varying standards seems unacceptable. The result of varying standards is to reinforce less ethical practice." Id. at 101. A rule of "caveat lawyer,'' however, concedes the unavailability of real guidance, and is in effect an
endorsement of the protean standards Professor Guernsey disapproves.
98. See infra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
99. See Rubin, supra note 3.
100. The proposal applies to negotiation generally and is not restricted to the private
settlement context.
101. Rubin, supra note 3, at 589.
102. Id. at 591.
103. Id. The judge also states that these duties of fairness are ones owed to the pro-
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Although fine in principle, Judge Rubin's homiletic standard
that a lawyer "act honestly and in good faith" is clearly insufficient as a benchmark for professional ethics in negotiation. It is
at once overinclusive and underspecific. Although few would disagree with it as a vague proposition, still fewer would adhere to
it if as a rule it commanded categorical candor. 104 Sounding out
an adversary through puffery is a commonly accepted negotiation device. m No rule of ethics should prohibit a lawyer from
denying authority to settle even if in fact he possesses such authority, or from estimating a case's settlement value in excess of
what he truly believes it to be. 106 A rule of absolute, unqualified
truthfulness runs counter to time-honored tactical conventions
of negotiation, and would reach conduct that no one deems worthy of censure. Incompatibility with the most basic standards of
the legal community would invite wholesale noncompliance and
render the rule ineffective.
On the other hand, the language of Judge Rubin's rule affords
too little guidance to the practicing attorney. "Good faith" is a
term of art that has long defied satisfactory definition. For some,
it no doubt means pursuing a client's advantage as vigorously as
the letter of the law will permit. For others, it means absolute
truthfulness. The duty to act "honestly" must likewise be defined with more precision. For some, misleading bluffs and exaggerations involve no breach of honesty; they are part of the game
Cession and must therefore override any duty owed to the client. Id. at 592.
104. Cf. Guernsey, supra note 3, at 125:
The profession . . . could justify adqption of a rule requiring absolute truthfulness. In other words, we could require a strict reading of DR 7-102(A)(5). Absolute truth, however, is not an acceptable approach. If the rules we have are difficult to enforce, adding such a rule would only increase violations without any
corresponding increase in the ability to regulate.
105. White, supra note 3, at 927 n.4; see also id. at 934:
Everyone expects a lawyer to distort the value of his own case, of his own facts
and arguments, and to deprecate those of his opponent. No one is surprised by
that, and the system accepts and expects that behavior. . . . By tolerating exaggeration and puffing in the sales transaction, but refusing to make misstatement
of one's intention actionable, the law may simply have recognized the bounds of
its control over human behavior.
106. The Comment to MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1 (1983)
clearly endorses this principle:
This Rule [Truthfulness in Statements to Others] refers to statements of
fact . . . . Under generally accepted conventions in negotiation, certain types of
statements ordinarily are not taken as statements of material fact. Estimates of
price or value placed on the subject of a transaction and a party's intentions as
to an acceptable settlement of a claim are in this category . . . .
But see Rubin, supra note 3, at 586 (noting that technical observance of expected rules
may not always constitute ethical behavior).
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both sides presumably play. 107 For others, even the slightest
deviation from the truth 108 encroaches upon the realm of dishonesty.109 Without further explanation of what does and does not
violate the notion of "honesty," and of what does and does not
breach "good faith," the rule rings hollow and is unhelpful.
The second part of Judge Rubin's ethical standard-that
prohibiting a lawyer from accepting a result unconscionable to
the other party-accomplishes little more than the first. Although an unconscionability rule reflects the proper spirit of negotiation ethics, 110 without a body of supporting case law such a
rule is too vague to be of practical value to negotiating attorneys. Furthermore, the imposition on negotiators of a duty to
avoid unconscionable results would eliminate only a small number of the most shocking cases. The profession can and should
do more to advance the cause of ethics in negotiation.

B.

Critics of Reform

Despite the basic merit of Judge Rubin's position, most legal
commentators find themselves on Professor Guernsey's side of
the argument. Criticism of efforts to reform negotiation ethics
with rules of professional responsibility has been varied, but can
be summarized briefly. First, some contend that negotiation
truthfulness is a culturally relative notion, a concept eluding
clear definition and thus ill-suited to regulation. m Second,
others argue that no rule of negotiation ethics could adequately
account for the variations in skill and sophistication that inhere
in a heterogeneous bar. As a result, the rule would burden some
lawyers more than others. 112 Finally, still others speculate that a
rule requiring truthfulness in private negotiations might meet
107. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
108. To many, the concept of truth poses a profound philosophical problem. See, e.g.,
S. BoK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE (1978). A definition of "truth"
is, of course, beyond the scope of the present inquiry.
109. Cf., e.g., Rubin supra note 3, at 581.
110. It may be argued that a duty to avoid unconscionable results already exists by
implication. The law treats settlement agreements as contracts. See RESTATEMENT (SEC·
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979); see also Havighurst, Problems Concerning Settlement
Agreements, 53 Nw. U.L. REV. 283, 295-308 (1958) (discussing how various contract doctrines relate to settlement releases). Therefore, the common law contract doctrine of unconscionability, see Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir.
1965), could already be said to safeguard settlement agreements against intolerable
unfairness.
111. White, supra note 3, at 929-31.
112. Hazard, supra note 3, at 193-95.
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with widespread opposition and violation in the practicing bar.
Such hypocrisy, it is argued, would serve no purpose but to discredit the value of the other rules and promote cynicism among
those who adhere to them. 113 These arguments are addressed in
order.
1. The relativity of "truth"- Professor White has argued
that truth in the negotiation context admits no absolute definition, and that drafting rules to demand what cannot be defined
is folly. 114 But conceding that truth in the negotiation context is
a relative concept does not lead to the conclusion that fashioning
standards for lawyers negotiating private settlements is either
inappropriate or impossible. A code of ethics must establish
some threshold level of truthfulness below which its members
may not fall in their professional conduct. Indeed, law in general
furthers order by transforming the relative into the normative. 116
Further, struggling with diverse notions of right and wrong to
establish normative standards that everyone can respect is precisely what rules of ethics, and laws generally, aim to do. 116
2. Unequal skill, unequal disclosure- Professor Hazard explains his resistance to formulating rules of negotiation ethics in
similar terms. Professor Hazard, too, recognizes the heterogeneity, particularly with respect to skill and sophistication, that
characterizes the American bar. 117 He concludes that formulating general rules that account for variations in professional sophistication is impossible. 118 Lawyers of high technical sophistication, possessing greater sensitivity to the obligations imposed
by the rules, would bear heavier burdens than the less sophisticated opposing counsel with whom they deal. The sophisticated
lawyer would face the dilemma of having to give more than he
gets in the way of truthful information, whereas the less sophisticated lawyer would risk jeopardizing a client's cause through
misguided openness or unnecessary disclosure. 119 This analysis,
however, presumes that any rule of negotiation ethics must necessarily allow wide variation in interpretation of its scope and
meaning. To the contrary, a clear, concise, and unambiguous
113. White, supra note 3, at 937.
114. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
115. See generally I. JENKINS, SOCIAL ORDER AND THE LIMITS OF LAW (1980).
116. For an informative empirical study of the many factors that affect lawyers' ethical conduct, see J. CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETHICS (1966).
117. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
118. "(l]n a situation where the opposing lawyers differ substantially in technical sophistication, a rule requiring reciprocal disclosure could not yield genuine reciprocity."
Hazard, supra note 3, at 195.
119. Id. at 194-96.

528

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 18:2

rule announcing what the profession expects of lawyers in private settlement negotiation could establish a normative standard
that virtually all lawyers could understand and maintain. 120 An
understandable rule would provide real guidance to those who
want to conform to professional standards, regardless of their
technical sophistication. 121 Moreover, if a rule of private settlement negotiation ethics results in even a slight increase in the
number of lawyers unwilling to conceal the fact of a critical witness's recanted testimony,1 22 or a change in law that would have
dramatic impact on the outcome of the case were it litigated, 123
then the rule would be fulfilling its intended purpose. 124
3. Unenforceability and opposition from the bar- Finally,
the conjecture that an unenforceable rule of ethics governing
private negotiation would meet with routine violation in the
practicing bar 125 offers scant justification for having no rule at
all. Professor White's hypothesis is that a rule of truthfulness in
negotiation would require lawyers educated in an adversary system to place abstract values above both instinctive self-interest
and important psychological associations with client and
cause. 126 From this he surmises that disobedience to the rule
would result. This conclusion, however, gives little credit to the
fact that rules of ethics are both norm-enforcing and norm-creating.127 They function not only as referents for discipline, but
as actual guidelines for conduct. 128 If drafted with clarity and
120. Granted, those who are inclined to violate the rules will not be deterred by any
directive in a code of ethics. But this is true in all areas of law, including those areas,
such as criminal law, where enforcement apparatuses are much more elaborate and the
risks of apprehension much greater.
121. Cf. McCracken, Report on Observance by the Bar of Stated Professional Standards, 37 VA. L. REV. 399, 425 (1951) ("Those who have been so fortunate as to serve on
the Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances of the American Bar Association
realize how eager, often pathetically eager, lawyers are to have perplexing ethical
problems resolved for them."). This national survey of the profession, conducted in 1951,
concluded that with few exceptions American lawyers maintain a strict observance to the
ethical standards set forth in the then operative Canons.
122. See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
123. Id.
124. This argument presumes the relative costlessness of the rule. See supra notes
81-88 and accompanying text.
125. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
126. White, supra note 3, at 937.
127. Professor White appears to concede this when he suggests that "it is conceivable
that lawyers would change their attitude if [an explicit and straightforward rule] were
enacted and if there were an effective means to inform the bar at large about such a
rule." Id. at 938.
128. As Justice Harlan observed in an unrelated context, "[o]ur expectations, and the
risks we assume, are in large part reflections of laws that translate into rules the customs
and values of the past and present." United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1970)
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with consideration for the basic values shared in the profession
and the society it represents, a rule of truthfulness to guide private settlement negotiation should win approval by a majority of
the bar. 129
Finally, it should be noted that the apparent unenforceability
of a standard of negotiation ethics does not justify having no
standard at all. 130 The Code of Professional Responsibility's
rules rarely result in the application of discipline. 131 Yet the
rules exist as vital indicia of what the profession expects from its
members. 132 Only by having such rules of ethics can the profession expect to inculcate values of truthfulness and fair play in its
ranks. It is in the service of this goal that the following proposal
is offered.
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
129. Cf. Schwartz, The Death and Regeneration of Ethics, 1980 AM. BAR FouNo. RESEARCH J. 953, 957:
The conformity of the members of a defined group to standards defining proper
behavior . . . depends on the clarity of the standards, the homogeneity of the
group, the communications network within it, and the extent to which the standards are consonant with commonly shared values and are positively and negatively reinforced.

See generally I. JENKINS, supra note 115, at 118-25.
In the 1983 Study on the Standards of Legal Negotiations, supra note 27, 42% of the
national sample of litigators felt that revising and clarifying the Code would be an effective way to improve ethical behavior in settlement negotiation. See also M. FRANKEL,
PARTISAN JUSTICE 86 (1980) (stating that there is "good reason to expect that changed
rules will significantly affect behavior-that professed commitments to the truth and to
fairer advocacy will have substantial meaning"). But see Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 Tux. L. REV. 639, 641-52 (1981) (arguing that the A.B.A.'s
rules of conduct do not promote ethical behavior); see also J. CARLIN, supra note 116, at
150-64 (study of New York metropolitan bar concluding that formal disciplinary controls
do little to affect the ethical behavior of lawyers).
130. It is not at all clear, however, that a rule for which no enforcement is available
will invariably result in disobedience. Legal history records many instances where less
than universally endorsed reforms and proscriptions met with compliance, despite the
absence of enforcement mechanisms. See, e.g., R. KAGAN, REGULATORY JUSTICE (1978)
(discussing the implementation of a noncoercive national wage-price freeze in 1971).
131. See, e.g., J. CARLIN, supra note 116, at 170 ("Very few violators are caught and
punished by the formal disciplinary machinery of the bar. We estimate that only about 2
per cent of the lawyers who violate generally accepted ethical norms are processed, and
fewer than 0.2 per cent are officially sanctioned.").
132. "Realists . . . know that stringent enforcement has not always characterized the
administration of the existing Code or any predecessor's prescriptions. But this, like everything else, is a challenge to the law reformers, not a recipe for paralysis.'' Frankel,
Why Does Professor Abel Work at a Useless Task?, 59 Tux. L. REv. 723, 730 (1981).
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SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATION ETHICS

FAIRNESS TO OTHER PARTICIPANTS 133
In conducting settlement negotiations,
(A) A lawyer shall at all times act in good
faith and with the primary objective
of resolving the dispute without court
proceedings;
(B) A lawyer shall not
( 1) Knowingly make any statement
that contains a misrepresentation of material fact or law or
that omits a fact necessary to
make the statement considered
as a whole not materially
misleading;
(2) Knowingly fail to
(a) Disclose to opposing counsel such material facts or
law as may be necessary to
correct manifest misappreh ens ions
thereof;
or,
alternatively,
(b) Give reasonable indication
to opposing counsel of the
possible inaccuracy of a
given material fact or law
upon which opposing counsel appears to rely. Such
indication may take the
form of statements of unwillingness to discuss . a
particular matter raised by
opposing counsel.
133. Portions of this model rule borrow liberally from the language of other rules
drafted by the American Bar Association. Subsection (B)(l) is a near verbatim adaptation of Rule 7.l(A) (Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services) of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct. Subsection (B)(2)(a) may be traced, in part, to Rule
4.2(b)(2) of the 1980 Discussion Draft of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. See
supra note 92.
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Comment
This Rule is designed to promote basic truthfulness in private
settlement negotiations. Its precise objective is to make a lawyer's duty of truthfulness in the negotiation setting coextensive
with his duty of candor toward a tribunal. Accordingly, the following interpretive guidelines are suggested.
1. Good Faith- The good faith commanded by subsection
(A) requires that a lawyer in negotiation conduct himself in such
a way as will maximize the potential for reaching a fair and expeditious settlement. 134 This includes, but is not limited to, a
duty to reciprocate the candor of opposing counsel with like candor, but in no instance with less truthfulness than that prescribed in subsection (B), and a duty to use information obtained in the course of the negotiation in a way constructive to
fair settlement.
2. Materiality- One objective of this Rule is to foster a high
correlation between the pattern of outcomes resulting from negotiation and those that could reasonably be expected to result
from trial. 136 The rationale for a duty of truthfulness that is coextensive in each setting is that this correlation will occur if
both sides in a negotiation have all the information that is likely
to be adduced during litigation. With this in mind, statements of
fact or law are to be construed as "material" when they would
meet the test of "relevancy" in the trial context. 136 This stan134. This is to be distinguished from the "good faith" principle in general contract
law. See Summers, 'Good Faith' in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195 (1968).
135. The goal of this rule is to achieve "high correlation" between outcomes, rather
than virtual identity of results. This goal recognizes the fact that compromise is often
the very essence of private settlement. In a negotiation, each disputant typically gives up
something he knows he may have gotten at trial, in the hope of showing good faith and
furthering the out-of-court disposition of the case. Because bargaining with concessions
has little to do -with trial, but is by contrast a critical facet of negotiation, some variance
between the outcomes of litigation and private settlement must be tolerated. Moreover,
to require negotiating attorneys to anticipate the results of trial with absolute precision
would unduly strain the settlement process with unrealistic expectations.
136. FED. R. Evm. 401 defines relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." (emphasis
added). At common law, "materiality" was the test for evidentiary relevancy. See FED. R.
Evm. 402 advisory committee note. Although the Federal Rules of Evidence have replaced the term "material" with a more precisely defined concept of relevancy, the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct continue to use materiality as a standard by which
to distinguish impermissibly false statements. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rules 3.3(a), 7.l(a) (1983). Because this Rule is drafted for inclusion in the
profession's code of ethics, it adopts the term "material" for its test.
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dard of materiality has the effect of preserving generally accepted conventions of negotiation, while proscribing forms of
misrepresentation that would cause substantial injustice.
Example 1- Lawyer (L) and Opposing Counsel (OC) are negotiating the settlement of a product liability claim. L states to
OC, "My client is eager to get this case before a jury and have
the dangerousness of Company X's products aired in open court.
He won't accept a settlement under $100,000." In fact, L's client
dreads the thought of going to court and has told L he would
gladly accept any offer of settlement over $10,000. The above
misrepresentation would not violate the Rule, because statements of a party's intentions as to an acceptable settlement
would not constitute relevant evidence at trial. 137 Likewise, the
Rule would permit L to deny having any settlement authority at
all, because the fact of a lawyer's possession or non-possession of
such authority would not constitute relevant evidence at trial.
Example 2- Lawyer (L) and Opposing Counsel (OC) are negotiating the settlement of personal injury claims arising out of
an automobile accident. L states to OC, "I have an eye-witness
who swears she saw your client driving at excessive speed at the
time of the collision." In fact, L knows of no such witness and is
merely bluffing. This misrepresentation would violate the Rule,
because an eye-witness's account of the circumstances giving rise
to a civil dispute would undoubtedly constitute relevant evidence at trial.
Example 3- Lawyer (L) and Opposing Counsel (OC) are negotiating the claims of Mrs. M, who witnessed her only child
killed by a reckless driver. Mrs. M's claims are for wrongful
death and emotional injury. Just two days prior to the negotia137. Under the liberal theory of relevancy endorsed by the Federal Rules of Evidence, one could reasonably argue, though, that offers to compromise, and related statements, constitute relevant evidence within the meaning of Rule 401. However, a comment to Rule 408, Compromise and Offers to Compromise, explicitly cites irrelevance as
a rationale for the non-admissibility of this kind of evidence:
As a matter of general agreement, evidence of an offer to compromise a claim is
not receivable in evidence as an admission of, as the case may be, the validity or
invalidity of the claim. As with evidence of subsequent remedial measures, dealt
with in Rule 407, exclusion may be based on two grounds. (1) The evidence is
irrelevant, since the offer may be motivated by a desire for peace rather than
from any concession of weakness of position . . . .
FED. R. Evm. 408 advisory committee note (emphasis added). But see Waltz & Huston,
The Rules of Evidence in Settlement, 5 LITIGATION, Fall 1978, at 11 (arguing that public
policy rationale, not relevancy, underlie the drafters' intent in Rule 408). The proposed
Rule explicitly approves the Advisory Committee's suggested interpretation, and thus
regards as irrelevant offers to compromise and statements of intent as to acceptable
settlement.
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tion, the state supreme court handed down a decision changing
the jurisdiction's rule with respect to the recoverability of damages for emotional injury. Previously, the court applied the socalled "zone of danger" test, making damages for emotional distress recoverable only if the person witnessing the injury was an
immediate family member and within the zone of danger. Now
the court has held that it will only require the family memberclaimant to have actually witnessed the injury to recover such
damages. L is aware of this recent change in the law, and has
reason to believe that OC is not. In the course of the negotiation,
L states, "Your wrongful death claim is questionable. And as far
as emotional injury, your client admitted she witnessed the accident from her front porch. Since she wasn't within the zone of
danger, she won't recover." The implicit misrepresentation contained in L's comment would violate the Rule, as the jurisdiction's law with respect to recoverability of damages for emotional distress would be relevant at trial. 138
3. Statements of fact- The Rule is intended to apply to
statements of law or fact, and does not reach statements of conjecture, theory, or opinion. No duty of truthfulness extends to
expressions of this kind. 139
Example 4- Lawyer (L) and Opposing Counsel (OC) are negotiating a claim of medical malpractice. L states to OC, "I'm
convinced your clients were negligent in the performance of
their surgery on my client." In fact, L has conferred with an expert witness, both concluding that the operation was probably
conducted with due care. Because the statement refers to the
personal belief of L, rather than to any material fact, the misrepresentation does not violate the Rule.
4. Duty to disclose or give reasonable indication of inaccuracy- Subsection (B)(2) gives the lawyer an option when faced
during negotiation with an adversary laboring under a manifest
misapprehension of material fact or law. He may either: (a) dis138. Moreover, as a matter of professional responsibility, L would have a duty to
disclose this authority to the court even though it is adverse to his client's position. See
supra note 41.
139. Negotiating attorneys are thus put on notice that an adversary who prefaces his
statements with the words "I think" or similar language, or begins discussion with the
remark that everything to be said is "hypothetical," has placed his communications beyond the reach of the Rule's protections. An attorney who negotiates a settlement despite such disclaimers by an adversary knowingly waives such protections. A client
prejudiced as a result may in certain circumstances have claims for malpractice; and in
such instances the attorney may be subject to discipline for breaching the duty of competent representation. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101
(1980); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1983).
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close such information as is necessary to disabuse the adversary
of his misconception, or (b) give some reasonable indication of
the possible inaccuracy of material information upon which opposing counsel appears to rely. 140
140. This duty might appear to impose a heavier burden of truthfulness on the negotiator than that currently imposed on the courtroom advocate. For although a lawyer
must inform the tribunal of an adversary's misapprehension of law, he owes no such duty
when it comes to correcting an opponent's mistake of fact. For an illustrative anecdote,
see S. WILLISTON, LIFE AND LAW 271 (1940). With respect to factual material, a trial
lawyer's only duties are not to use perjured testimony, not to make false statements, and
not to participate in the creation or preservation of evidence known to be false. MODEL
CoDE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A) (1980). These duties clearly refer to
a lawyer's affirmative conduct in court, and create no obligation of factual disclosure
when confronted with an adversary's misapprehensions.
The apparent imbalance in the level of ethics required in each setting, however, is
misleading. The basic congruence of a trial advocate's duties of truthfulness under DR 7102(A) and a negotiator's duty of disclosure under subsection (B)(2) is best understood
by contrasting the normative structure of trial and negotiation. In negotiation, legal arguments and factual information are exchanged in an essentially ad hoc process. Although this process acts as a kind of shadow-trial, see supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text, the only rules that govern it are those of conversational discourse and civility.
In the ordinary conversation, for example, a statement by A invites, indeed demands, a
response from B. Typically, the response will take the form of either a return statement,
a question, or some otherwise meaningful gesture. But it need not, for silence itself is a
type of response. It may mean anything from assent to an idea, to concurrence with an
opinion, to affirmation of a statement. Rarely, if ever, though, does silence signify nothing. In conversation, the decision to keep silent represents a form of affirmative behavior;
it is as much a part of the discussion as speech, and thus directly implicated in the
overall understanding that emerges therefrom.
Trial, by contrast, is thoroughly controlled by norms of process, and is in almost no
sense conversational. Lawyer A presents evidence, after which Lawyer B may either
cross-examine or present rebuttal evidence. Lawyer A asserts a conclusion based on the
evidence; Lawyer B argues an alternative view. And so the case proceeds to judgment.
This structure of courtroom advocacy allows for no direct exchanges between the lawyers
themselves. Rather, it is designed to facilitate information flow between the lawyers and
the tribunal. Rules of court do not even permit, much less require, lawyers to respond in
any direct way to the statements of their adversary. Even evidentiary and procedural
objections are made to a judge, and such objections are not used to affirm or deny the
substantive assertions of opposing counsel. It is not surprising to observe, therefore, that
no canons of ethics command courtroom disclosure of factual material. Quite appropriately, the applicable rules relate to a lawyer's duty to be truthful in terms of the evidence he presents and the statements he makes to the tribunal. Because direct response
to statements of opposing counsel is not a part of the trial process, silence does in this
setting signify nothing. It neither affirms nor refutes, but is merely appropriate courtroom conduct. A lawyer's silence in the face of an adversary's misstatement at trial,
therefore, does not implicate him in the statement itself in the way it would during a
bilateral negotiation.
In sum, the normative structure of settlement negotiation distinguishes itself from
that of trial in at least one important respect. In negotiation, owing to its conversational
format, a lawyer's silence typically conveys meaning and thus constitutes affirmative conduct. At trial, conversely, an attorney's silence in the face of an adversary's statements
represents neutral behavior rather than any kind of affirmative response. For this reason,
a duty of disclosure in the negotiation context is analogous to existing duties of truthfulness with respect to affirmative behavior at trial. Given the difference in the normative
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Example 5- Lawyer (L) represents a prominent golf pro (G)
who suffered a disabling back injury when he slipped on a ball
negligently left in a dark clubhouse corridor. Although the newspapers reported G's injury as permanent, G has spent the past
month abroad receiving medical treatment with positive results.
He now works out, practices daily, and doctors have given assurances that he will be back on the playing circuit within a year. G
informs L of these developments prior to the commencement of
settlement talks. During negotiation, however, it is clear that
Opposing Counsel (OC) still believes that the damage to G's
back is irreversible. He states, "What has happened to your client is a terrible thing, and we want to do right by him. Suffering
ash~ is now, his career gone forever, we want to do all we can to
ease the pain."
In this situatio'n, subsection (B)(2) of the Rule gives L an option. Since G's physical condition is a matter of material fact,
and OC's misapprehension as to the true status of this condition
is manifest, L must either: (a) tell OC about the treatment G has
been receiving and the likelihood of his being able to return to
the pro circuit; or (b) give OC such reasonable indication as to
put him on notice of the possible inaccuracy of his perception of
G's health. Although L need not inform OC of the exact prognosis for G's recovery, he may not permit OC's misperception of
this critical fact to go completely unchecked. His second option,
therefore, would be to make some statement to indicate nonassent to the misapprehended fact. He may say, for example: "I'm
not willing to discuss either the extent of my client's suffering or
his future career prospects." Or, he might say, "If you want to
depose my client or his doctors to find out the extent of the injuries, you may. We're only here to discuss settlement."
Statements such as these satisfy the dictates of subsection
(B)(2)(b), as they put OC on notice that information upon which
he appears to rely may be inaccurate. Although such statements
amount to at least partial disclosure, it is important that a lawyer be able to keep some cards close to the chest without violating his duty of truthful negotiation behavior. No rule of negotiation ethics should oblige a lawyer to submit to cross-examination
by his adversary. Yet neither should rules of professional conduct permit one attorney to profit unfairly from the manifest
structure of the two processes, comparing a negotiator's obligation in terms of what he
chooses to say and not say, with a trial lawyer's ethical responsibility of truthful evidentiary presentation, is the appropriate inquiry when fashioning duties that are in essence
coextensive.
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misapprehensions of opposing counsel. Subsection (B)(2)(b)
strikes a compromise. The notice it ensures prevents a settlement from being negotiated on the basis of misinformation. Yet
the form this notice takes allows a lawyer to remain in the negotiation without giving up facts he would rather force his adversary to discover independently. Given that candor toward opposing counsel will be reciprocated with like candor, the wisdom of
making statements like the foregoing is questionable. But the
Rule takes account of the varying tactical predilections of legal
negotiators, and allows lawyers to conduct truthful settlement
without having to research for their adversaries. Such a compromise affords lawyers a certain amourit of strategic freedom when
negotiating, yet at the same time safeguards the integrity of information that will ultimately produce settlement.
. CONCLUSION

Private settlement negotiation is a largely unregulated area of
law in terms of the ethical duties imposed on attorneys. The absence of professional controls on this increasingly important process permits abuse and injustice. This is particularly disturbing
when one considers lawyer-negotiated settlement not as an alternative to legal adjudication, but as itself an alternative form of
adjudication.
The Model Rule presented in this Note is not a talismanic solution to every type of ethical problem in the negotiation behavior of practicing attorneys. It is vulnerable to avoidance by the
artful and, like all rules of professional responsibility, disobedience by the unethical. The Rule would, however, be a commendable statement from the bar to its members about what kind of
conduct is expected in this critical area of the profession. As
such, it would strengthen the public's currently uncertain trust
of the law and its practitioners, and more importantly, advance
the cause of legal ethics among lawyers.

-Robert B. Gordon

